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DISCLOSURE OF CONFLICTS OF INTEREST IN THE ORTHOPAEDIC FIELD
AND IN MEDICAL EDUCATION. Brian L. Ju, Christopher P. Miller, Peter G.
Whang, Jonathan N. Grauer. Department of Orthopaedics and Rehabilitation, Yale
University, School of Medicine, New Haven, CT.
The purpose of this study was to determine the variability in disclosure information reported by
authors at three annual orthopaedic conferences in the same year. Furthermore, we examined the number of
medical schools with disclosure policies regarding educational activities and the acceptance of gifts from
industry (law school policies were similarly analyzed for comparison). We hypothesize there will be
significant variability in disclosure of conflicts of interest in both the professional and educational arena.
The author disclosure information published for the 2008 North American Spine Society (NASS),
Cervical Spine Research Society (CSRS), and Scoliosis Research Society (SRS) conferences were
compiled into a database and examined. Online disclosure policies for all 131 accredited medical schools
and all 200 accredited law schools were evaluated during August/September 2009.
Disclosure records were available for 1,231 authors at NASS, 550 at CSRS, and 642 at SRS. Of the
153 authors who presented at the NASS and CSRS meetings, 51% exhibited discrepancies in their
disclosure information. Of the 131 accredited medical schools, 98% (vs. 18% of law schools) had protocols
in place requiring faculty to disclose their financial relationships to their institutions. Only a small
percentage of both medical and law schools required lecturers to disclose these associations with students.
40% of medical schools (vs. 1% of law schools) had established policies limiting gifts from industry.
These findings emphasize the significant variability that currently exists in the reporting of
financial conflicts of interest by authors who presented at three major spine conferences. We believe these
discrepancies are likely due to confusion regarding what relationships should be acknowledged in certain
situations and the clear lack of uniformity among the disclosure policies. Not only in the professional arena,
but the widespread implementation of disclosure guidelines in medical schools emphasizes the
acknowledged need to regulate physician-industry relationships. The varied policies addressing faculty
disclosures and the acceptance of gifts demonstrate that the regulation to these relationships remains
inconsistent.
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INTRODUCTION

Conflicts of Interest in Orthopaedics
As the resources for scientific endeavors offered by traditional sources of funding
such as the National Institutes of Health have continued to decline, private industry has
taken on a greater role in providing financial support and other opportunities to
physicians. These arrangements allow companies to take advantage of the knowledge and
experience of clinicians while facilitating the completion of studies that are of interest to
both parties. These physician-industry interactions may take on various forms, including
research grants, consulting agreements, advisory board positions, royalties, or stock
options; given their value to these companies, it is not unreasonable for these clinicians to
expect to be fairly compensated for their time and effort on these projects.
Although these partnerships may in many cases foster advances in medical care
and technology, there are growing concerns regarding the negative consequences of
clinicians working closely with industry [1-5]. Many critics have suggested that these
relationships may unduly influence the professional judgment of clinicians who are
otherwise bound to place the welfare of their patients above all else. For instance, any
investigators with a direct financial stake in the outcomes of a study are particularly
susceptible to bias which may compromise the veracity of their research at any point
from the conception of the experimental design [6] to the actual analysis and
interpretation of results [7,8]. As a result, these associations have come under greater
scrutiny in recent years as the prevalence of industry-sponsored studies has increased.
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One initial strategy that has been widely implemented in an attempt to limit the

effects of industry involvement on scientific inquiries is to establish an environment of
transparency so that all of an individual physician’s corporate ties are readily available to
the public [9]. However, the goal of disclosure is not necessarily to eliminate all sources
of bias but to inform the readership of the existence of possible conflicts of interest
(COIs) and allow them to draw their own conclusions about the objectivity of the authors
[10]. Some critics of mandatory disclosure insist that financial incentives represent only
one of many factors that investigators take into consideration when performing a study
and is therefore unlikely to alter the findings to a great extent [11]. Regardless, the
scientific community has strongly advocated disclosure as a method for protecting the
integrity of the research process, and the majority of journals and conferences have
adopted some mechanism for the reporting of financial disclosure information [12].
There are generally two types of disclosure policies that are being implemented,
one of which requires authors to simply reveal the relationships that are germane to the
research being presented [13] while the other entails the comprehensive documentation of
all of their financial dealings with industry regardless of whether they are relevant to the
current investigation [14,15]. While both of these approaches are intended to maintain the
transparency of clinician-scientists, the inconsistencies between these two sets of
guidelines and their often ambiguous definitions of what constitutes a true conflict of
interest (COI) has led to continuing confusion among physicians and may even yield
inappropriate or inadequate disclosure of their industry ties. Nevertheless, the clarity and
effectiveness of these two disclosure protocols have not been well characterized. The
purpose of this part of the investigation was to compare the self-reported disclosure
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information of authors attending three major spine conferences in the same calendar year
(2008 annual meetings of the North American Spine Society, Cervical Spine Research
Society, and Scoliosis Research Society) and to quantify the variability between their
published data.

Conflicts of Interest in Medical Education
Much like their counterparts in the post-graduate stage, medical schools often rely
on partnerships with commercial entities to ensure continuing progress in biomedical
research and student education. However, such relationships have come under closer
scrutiny in recent years, in part because of their potential to influence medical education
[16-22].
The primary concern is that COIs arise when physicians in academia form
relationships with industry which may affect both their clinical and research endeavors.
Financial relationships that directly result in personal or monetary gain such as grant
support, stocks, and consulting positions, clearly represent potential COIs, but even
seemingly less significant patterns of interaction with industry exemplified by travel
reimbursements, honoraria, office supplies, and other gifts have been shown to subtly
bias physicians’ judgments and possibly manipulate their perceptions over time [23-26].
In an effort to bolster public trust in our nation’s medical institutions, as well as to
ensure the continued integrity of medical education and biomedical research, the
Association of American Medical Colleges (AAMC) and the Accreditation Council for
Continuing Medical Education (ACCME) have published guidelines to assist members in
managing industry collaborations in accord with higher standards of medical
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professionalism. Aside from focusing on many aspects of the interactions that exist
between industry and individuals in academia, these recommendations also underscore
the importance of this issue [27,28].
The influence of commercial entities on the field of medicine may affect
physicians at every level of training. In particular, the degree of interaction industry has
had with medical professionals throughout all of the stages in their education raises
questions about the overt or subtle effects of this presence in academic settings, including
the classroom or laboratory. For example, a recent New York Times article describes a
pharmacology professor at Harvard Medical School who touted the benefits of
cholesterol-lowering drugs and inappropriately minimized their side-effects without
acknowledging to his students that he was a consultant to several pharmaceutical
companies that market these types of medications [29]. These and other similar incidents
illustrate how industry affiliations may sway both practicing physicians and the next
generation of healthcare providers.
One method that has been proposed for enhancing the transparency of individuals
who educate medical students is the mandatory disclosure of their industry relationships
to their students. This approach has been widely adopted by medical journals and
professional societies which have proven this strategy to be reasonably effective for
regulating these collaborations [9-12]. Similar policies requiring medical school faculty
to disclose their COIs may be equally as beneficial for maintaining their transparency.
This information may allow students to form their own judgments about the merits of
lectures given by individuals with industry connections. By emphasizing the necessity of
divulging these relationships, these protocols may also compel physicians-in-training to
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be cognizant of the impact of commercial ties and hopefully serve as a framework to
guide them during their subsequent interactions with corporate interests in the future.
While faculty disclosure has taken on increasing significance among medical
practitioners, it is unclear how prevalent these policies are in other professions (that are
often held to similar ethical benchmarks), such as the legal community. COIs inevitably
arise between lawyers and third parties but the American Bar Association (ABA), which
provides accreditation of law schools and is the legal analog to the AAMC, does not
mandate disclosure at its educational programs or insist that its institutions address
attorney-industry relationships in a certain fashion [30]. Thus, the manner in which this
issue is discussed is solely determined by each individual law school.
The purpose of this part of the study was to quantify the number of medical
schools with policies that specifically require faculty disclosure of financial relationships
to their institutions and/or their students and to characterize their policies regarding the
acceptance of gifts from industry. In addition, these guidelines were compared with any
analogous protocols implemented by law schools in an attempt to assess the relative
importance of reporting COIs within each respective field and to provide a larger
perspective on this issue.
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OBJECTIVES

The purpose of this study was to determine the variability in disclosure
information reported by authors at three annual orthopaedic conferences in the same year.
Furthermore, we examined the number of medical schools with disclosure policies
regarding educational activities and the acceptance of gifts from industry (law school
policies were similarly analyzed for comparison). We hypothesize there will be
significant variability in disclosure of conflicts of interest in both the professional and
educational arena.
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METHODS

COI in Orthopaedics

We retrospectively reviewed the disclosure listings for all of the authors
presenting at the 2008 North American Spine Society (NASS), Cervical Spine Research
Society (CSRS), and Scoliosis Research Society (SRS) conferences which were printed
in the final program for each meeting. Individuals submitting abstracts to these meetings
were obliged to declare their potential conflicts of interest by February 2008 for NASS
and SRS, whereas the corresponding deadline for CSRS was June 2008. Although it is
possible that the disclosure status of a participant may have changed during the few
months between these dates, we operated under the assumption that the incidence of any
such modifications would be minimal.
The official disclosure policies for these meetings were obtained from the website
of the sponsoring society and corroborated by the corresponding program brochures as
well as by phone calls to the respective societies (see Appendix). According to these
references, NASS and CSRS requested that surgeons report any and all financial
relationships regardless of their relevance to the research being presented, while SRS
only solicited disclosures that were directly connected to that particular study.
Since the guidelines established by NASS and CSRS were analogous, we were
able to compare the industry affiliations of authors who attended these conferences
because their disclosures would supposedly be identical. For example, a surgeon
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acknowledging three industry associations to NASS who registered the same three
entities with CSRS would be classified as displaying “no discrepancies.” However,
another author who recorded three conflicts of interest to NASS but only revealed two to
CSRS would be considered to have “1 discrepancy.”
In contrast, the project-specific policy implemented by SRS made it necessary to
employ a different strategy to compare this data to that generated by NASS and CSRS.
For those who presented their work at the SRS and either or both of the other meetings, it
would be expected that all of the collaborations declared to SRS should also have been
listed by NASS or CSRS under their global disclosure policies. If all of the industry
entanglements that an author reported to SRS were also noted within the larger set of
financial relationships supplied to NASS or CSRS, he or she was thought to possess “no
discrepancies.” Similarly, individuals who had no conflicts of interest at SRS but were
found to have one or more at NASS or CSRS were still deemed as having “no
discrepancy” because these investigators may not have had any commercial ties related to
their studies yet still possess other financial interests that did not have to be conveyed to
SRS (but would still have to be shared with NASS and CSRS). Conversely, a disclosure
that was published at the SRS conference but not at the NASS or CSRS conventions was
categorized as “1 discrepancy”.
For the purpose of comparison, all of the researchers were segregated into 3
separate groups based upon which two of the three meetings they had attended:
NASS/CSRS; SRS/NASS; and SRS/CSRS. In each cohort we identified the authors with
no changes in their listings and those with discrepancies in the disclosures that they had
divulged to the two societies, focusing on those who had apparently had no affiliations at
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one convention but declared one or more financial interests at the other. Furthermore, we
also recorded the number of different industry relationships each individual with
consistent data had acknowledged, as well as the number of discrepancies that existed
between the information submitted to the two conferences by participants who exhibited
variability in their disclosure status.

COI in Medical Education

Medical School Review
A list of the 131 medical schools accredited by the Association of American
Medical Colleges (AAMC) was obtained from its official website (www.aamc.org). The
disclosure policies and physician-industry interaction protocols for all of these
institutions are publically available and were acquired from each school’s website during
the month of August 2009.

Disclosure policy to students
Each disclosure policy was analyzed using several criteria. First, we noted which
medical schools had established formal guidelines requiring classroom lecturers to
disclose their industry affiliations to their students. We subsequently determined whether
the institution had similar policies dictating that faculty members divulge their
commercial ties to students with whom they would be performing research. Finally, we
calculated the proportion of medical schools that were also accredited by the
Accreditation Council for Continuing Medical Education (ACCME).
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The rationale for characterizing the proportion of ACCME-accredited medical

schools was that this organization issues specific guidelines to its member institutions
regarding disclosure of industry relationships. [13] These ACCME directives apply to
individuals who seek Continuing Medical Education (CME) credits or participate in these
events. According to these regulations, lecturers at sanctioned speaking engagements
must disclose any relevant commercial ties prior to the beginning of the educational
activity. Even though the ACCME protocol is not necessarily part of medical schools’
formal policies, the adherence to these principles reflects an increasing awareness of the
importance of acknowledging COIs to those in attendance and maintaining full
transparency.

Physician-industry interaction policy
Each medical school’s policy regarding physician-industry interactions was also
reviewed for statements that related to the acceptance of gifts by physicians or other
academic faculty from commercial entities. We quantified the proportion of medical
schools that explicitly prohibited the receipt of gifts and/or defined the types of items that
were allowed.

Law School Review
A similar evaluation of law schools was performed for the purpose of comparison
to the data collected for the medical schools. The 200 law schools accredited by the
American Bar Association (ABA) were identified from its official website
(www.aba.org). The disclosure guidelines and policies for attorney-industry interactions
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of these institutions are all publicly available and were recorded from each school’s
website. All protocols were analyzed using the same methods that were described
previously for the medical school policies during the month of September 2009.
While law schools are accredited by the American Bar Association, there is no
national governing body equivalent to the ACCME that oversees legal education; in each
state this responsibility is generally fulfilled by its supreme court or another designated
committee. The American Academy of Law Schools (AALS) is a close analog of the
AAMC that supports legal education, but it is not involved in the accreditation of law
schools.
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RESULTS

COI in Orthopaedics

Disclosure information was available for 1,231 authors at NASS, 550 at CSRS,
and 642 at SRS; of these researchers, 278 (NASS), 129 (CSRS), and 181 (SRS) also
presented at one of the other conferences with 40 having listings for all three conferences.
The three data sets analyzed in this study were comprised of 153 individuals for
NASS/CSRS, 205 for SRS/NASS, and 56 for SRS/CSRS which represents 334 out of the
total of 2,049 possible author combinations derived from all three conferences (Figure 1).
The mean (± standard deviation) and median number of disclosures for these authors
were 1.8 ± 3.5 and 1, respectively.
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Number of authors at annual 2008 spine meetings
NASS
Instructions- Disclose everything

Total: 1231

Total # different authors: 2049
Total overlap: 334

913

113

165
40

381

16

421

CSRS

SRS

Instructions- Disclose everything

Instructions- Disclose relevant to presentation

Total: 550

Total: 642

Figure 1. Venn diagram delineating the general disclosure policies of each organization and classifying the
authors who attended the three conferences.

NASS and CSRS
153 authors presented at the NASS and CSRS meetings, both of which required
disclosure of all industry collaborations regardless of their relevance. 51% of this group
was noted to have contradictory information of which 32% had one discrepancy, 24%
possessed two, and 44% demonstrated three or more. In addition, 45% of these
individuals affirmed that they had “nothing to disclose” at one of the conferences yet
informed the other society of at least one financial relationship (Figure 2a, 2b).
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Discrepancies in disclosure reporting for authors
who attended both NASS and CSRS
# of reported disclosures

# of discrepancies
49%

51%
32%

13%

2+
disclosures

1
disclosure

0

20%

No
Discrepancy

Discrepancy
Present

n = 75

n = 78

discrepancy

3+
discrepancies

2

disclosures

67%

44%

1

discrepancies

24%

Figure 2a. Proportion of authors attending NASS and CSRS who were noted to have discrepancies in their
disclosure information for the two conferences, including the number of discrepancies exhibited by
individuals with inconsistencies as well as the number of industry relationships reported by those without
any discrepancies.

	
  

15	
  

Percentage of common NASS/CSRS authors who
disclosed nothing at one conference vs. something
at the other
Type of discrepancy
49%

51%
45%
55%

No
Discrepancy

Discrepancy
Present

n = 75

n = 78

0 disclosure
1+ disclosure at
vs. 1+ disclosure
both conferences

Figure 2b. Proportion of authors attending NASS and CSRS with documented discrepancies that identified
no disclosures at one conference but declared at least one conflict of interest at the other.

The other 49% of authors attending NASS and SRS were completely consistent in
their reporting with the majority (67%) having no industry associations while 20% and
13% named one versus two or more commercial entities, respectively (Figure 2a). This
trend of researchers with accurate disclosure statements typically having no conflicts of
interest was apparent for all three pairs of meetings (Figure 2a, 3a, 4a).

SRS and NASS
Unlike the global disclosure guidelines of NASS and CSRS, SRS utilized a more
limited policy that involved the declaration of any financial ties that were specific to that

	
  

16	
  

investigation. According to the results of this assessment, only 9% of the 205 authors
presenting research at both SRS and NASS demonstrated irregularities in their
information, with 95% having one discrepancy and 5% revealing two or more. Moreover,
42% of surgeons with disparities had indicated that they had “nothing to disclose” in
response to the all-inclusive requirements of NASS while confirming the existence of at
least one industry affiliation to SRS (Figure 3a, 3b).

Discrepancies in disclosure reporting for authors
who attended both SRS and NASS
# of reported disclosures

# of discrepancies
91%

5%

13%

2+
disclosures

1
disclosure

0

2+
discrepancies

13%

No
Discrepancy

Discrepancy
Present

n = 186

n = 19

disclosures

9%

1
discrepancy

74%
95%

Figure 3a. Proportion of authors attending SRS and NASS who were noted to have discrepancies between
their project-specific disclosures at SRS and their global disclosures at NASS, including the number of
discrepancies exhibited by individuals with inconsistencies as well as the number of industry relationships
reported by those without any discrepancies.
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Percentage of common SRS/NASS authors who
disclosed something at SRS vs. nothing at NASS

Type of discrepancy
91%
42%

No
Discrepancy
n = 186

Discrepancy
Present
n = 19

9%

0 NASS
disclosure
vs. 1+ SRS
disclosure

58%
1+ disclosure at
both conferences

Figure 3b. Proportion of authors attending SRS and NASS with documented discrepancies that identified
no disclosures at NASS but declared at least one conflict of interest at SRS.

The other 91% of authors with research investigations at both SRS and NASS
were found to have uniform reporting of their conflicts of interest. Although the
preponderance (74%) of these researchers had no disclosures, 13% listed one source of
industry support and another 13% admitted to having two or more (Figure 3a).

SRS and CSRS
Of the 56 authors common to both the SRS and CSRS meetings, 18% were
observed to have incongruous disclosure information. In this subset of individuals, 60%
had one discrepancy and 40% had two or more. As with the other pairs of conferences,
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50% of those with inconsistencies marked “nothing to disclose” as part of their global
disclosures to CSRS but cited at least one financial relationship at the SRS convention
(Figure 4a, 4b).

Discrepancies in disclosure reporting for authors
who attended both SRS and CSRS
# of reported disclosures

# of discrepancies
82%

2+

40%

15%

18%

disclosures

1
disclosure

0

9%

No
Discrepancy
n = 46

disclosures

Discrepancy
Present
n = 10

2+
1

discrepancies

discrepancy

76%
60%

Figure 4a. Proportion of authors attending SRS and CSRS who were noted to have discrepancies between
their project-specific disclosures at SRS and their global disclosures at CSRS, including the number of
discrepancies exhibited by individuals with inconsistencies as well as the number of industry relationships
reported by those without any discrepancies.
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Percentage of common SRS/CSRS authors who
disclosed something at SRS vs. nothing at CSRS

Type of discrepancy
82%
18%

No
Discrepancy
n = 46

Discrepancy
Present
n = 10

50%
0 CSRS
disclosure
vs. 1+ SRS
disclosure

50%
1+ disclosure at
both conferences

Figure 4b. Proportion of authors attending SRS and CSRS with documented discrepancies that identified
no disclosures at CSRS but declared at least one conflict of interest at SRS.

The remaining 82% of this cohort displayed no discrepancies between what they
had furnished to SRS and CSRS. A large proportion (76%) of these researchers
maintained that they had no financial interests with 9% and 15% designating either one or
more than one industry relationship, respectively (Figure 4a).

COI in Medical Education

Medical School Policies
Disclosure policies
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Of the 131 AAMC-accredited medical schools, 98% had policies in place

requiring faculty members to disclose their financial relationships to their institution, and
92% of the schools were accredited by the ACCME (Figure 5). However, just 4% of the
medical schools were found to have formal guidelines obliging lecturers to divulge their
commercial interests to students prior to the beginning of an educational activity, and 5%
of these institutions expected faculty to convey their industry affiliations to those
engaging in joint research projects. Only 2% of all medical schools expected disclosure
information to be reported to individuals in both of these situations.

Percent of AAMC medical schools

Proportion of medical schools
with disclosure policies
100
90
80
70
60

98%
92%

50
40
30
20
10
0
Disclosure ACCME
policy
accredited

4%

5%

Lecture
policy

Research
policy

2%

Both

Figure 5. Proportion of AAMC-accredited medical schools that have policies requiring faculty disclosure
to students.
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Physician-industry interaction policies
Although 22% of medical schools prohibited the receipt of any item from an
industry source regardless of its monetary value, more than half (60%) had no preemptive
restrictions on the acceptance of gifts (Figure 6). The remaining 18% of institutions set
specific limits for these gifts; of this cohort of schools, 15% allowed the acceptance of
nominal benefits related to “academic pursuits” (i.e. office supplies, honoraria, or travel
reimbursements) and 3% capped the total value of gifts accepted to less than $300
annually.

Percent of AAMC medical schools

Medical school policies on industry gifts
100
90
80
70

60%

60
50
40
30
20
10
0

22%
15%
3%
cannot receive any
form of gifts

only office supplies,
honoraria, or travel
allowed

total gifts <$300
annually

no gift restrictions

Figure 6. Medical school policies on the acceptance of industry gifts by faculty.
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Law School Policies
Of the 200 law schools accredited by the ABA, 18% had adopted policies
requiring faculty to disclose their financial relationships to their institution (Figure 7).
However, none of these institutions stipulated that lecturers acknowledge their industry
relationships to students prior to the beginning of an educational activity or embarking on
research endeavors. Only 1% of law schools regulated the gifts that professors were able
to accept from commercial interests; moreover, the protocols that did exist were vague
and did not include actual dollar amounts or values.

Percent of AAMC medical / ABA law schools

Proportion of medical/law schools
with disclosure policies
100

98%

90

Medical school

80

Law school

70
60
50
40
30
20

18%

10

4%

0
Disclosure policy

0%

Lecture policy

5%

0%

Research policy

Figure 7. A comparison between medical and law school faculty disclosure policies during lectures and
research activities.
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DISCUSSION

The issue of physician-industry conflicts of interest has taken on greater
significance in recent years such that most journals and medical societies have instituted
some form of disclosure policy in order to uphold the fundamental integrity of scientific
research. Nevertheless, the efficacy of these measures has not been elucidated and there
is still very little data addressing the consistency of the disclosure information provided
by authors performing investigations in the field of spine surgery. Similarly, in an
attempt to address these concerns and maintain the transparency of their faculty, many
medical schools are continuing to revise their guidelines on COI. The purpose of this
review was to evaluate the variability in the self-reported disclosures of physicians both
in the professional arena (who present at national conferences to other practicing
physicians) and the academic arena (who educate the rising physicians of tomorrow).

COI in Orthopaedics

These comparisons revealed a higher than anticipated prevalence of
inconsistencies among the disclosure records of researchers participating in these three
meetings. Despite the fact that both NASS and CSRS had requested acknowledgement of
all industry affiliations (i.e. global disclosure), one out of every two authors (51%) who
had attended both meetings exhibited contradictory information in the final programs
with nearly half of them (44%) having three or more discrepancies. Although it is
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conceivable that the number or type of an investigator’s financial relationships may have
undergone some modification during the four months between the abstract submission
deadlines for NASS (February 2008) and CSRS (June 2008), it certainly would not be
expected for the disclosure status of so many of these individuals to change so
dramatically within such a short period of time. In addition, 45% of this cohort declared
no industry ties at one conference but identified at least one conflict of interest at the
other, which suggests that the current guidelines are insufficient for establishing absolute
transparency which is now more than ever necessary to maintain the public’s trust in the
medical community.
One possible explanation for these irregularities is that while authors were
instructed to inform NASS and CSRS of all industry connections regardless of their
relevance to the studies being presented, they may have misinterpreted these instructions
and only cited those disclosures that were pertinent to their work. Alternatively, these
findings may reflect the inadvertent omission of one or more commercial entities by
physicians who are less diligent in keeping records of their industry relationships.
Another possibility is that there is simply a lack of effective penalties, for both authors
and their corresponding industry liaisons, to correct naiveties in attitude where accurate
disclosure is concerned. In either case, this analysis serves to quantify the significant
degree of variability that exists between the self-reported global disclosure listings
documented for the 2008 NASS and CSRS conferences.
Of the remaining 49% of authors in the NASS/CSRS group who were not noted to
have any discrepancies, a large majority (67%) indicated that they had nothing to
disclose; similar percentages were also calculated for the SRS/NASS and SRS/CSRS data
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sets as well (74% and 76%, respectively). Not surprisingly, it appears as if physicians are
more likely to respond in a consistent fashion in the absence of any industry
collaborations because they can presumably declare “no disclosures” across the board for
all meetings.
Besides assessing the rate of inaccuracies between the information submitted to
NASS and CSRS, we also evaluated the project-specific conflicts of interest collected by
SRS with respect to the other societies with their global disclosure policies. The
frequencies of irregularities in the SRS/NASS and SRS/CSRS cohorts were only 9% and
18%, respectively, with most of these individuals possessing only a single discrepancy.
Interestingly, 42% of individuals with inconsistencies cited one or more financial
relationships at SRS but nothing at NASS; this percentage was even higher (50%) among
those with studies at both SRS and CSRS. Finally, the finding that a significant
proportion of authors in each these groups (91% for SRS/NASS and 82% for SRS/CSRS)
were consistent in their disclosures between these two conferences implies that authors
may be more proficient at recognizing industry affiliations that are directly related to
their investigations.
This review emphasizes the extensive variability that existed in the self-reported
disclosure information of authors presenting at three major spine conferences within the
past year. Yet these implications most probably extend outside the particular subspecialty
of spine to the larger field of orthopaedics as well, since orthopaedics is an area that has
traditionally and continues to deal heavily with industry. If such discrepancies occur in
major spine conferences, it is likely to occur in other areas as well, and it would be
interesting to see further such studies in comparison to this one. If nothing else, it
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behooves the readership to use the lessons presented here as an educational insight into a
not-so-clear disclosure system, so that they can protect both themselves and their
integrity.
Rather than attributing these results to intentional duplicity, we believe that these
disparities are most likely due to confusion regarding which financial relationships
should be divulged in different situations given the lack of uniformity among the
disclosure policies of these associations. It certainly appears as if authors are more
proficient at identifying collaborations that are germane to their work than they are at
imparting an accurate and comprehensive listing of every single one of their industry
affiliations. Nevertheless, an inherent challenge associated with project-specific
disclosure guidelines is that it may often be difficult for clinician-scientists to discern
which financial ties are in fact relevant to their research. This risk of omission represents
one of the primary reasons why many forums consider global disclosure to be the most
effective strategy for establishing transparency.
Many organizations including NASS, CSRS, and SRS, have recognized the
complex issues involved in the reporting of physician-industry relationships and are in
the process of revising their disclosure policies so that they are better able to monitor
these types of interactions and ensure that they are in accord with appropriate ethical
benchmarks. Based on the relatively high frequency of inconsistencies evident in the
disclosure information provided by spine surgeons at these meetings, we recommend that
more explicit and standardized guidelines be elaborated by these societies in order to
facilitate the accurate disclosure of financial relationships and to minimize their potential
effects on scientific investigations. Be it a global disclosure policy or project-specific
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disclosure policy that we ultimately implement, the policy should be a uniform one across
all societies as a first step of many toward our goal of transparency. While it is true that
the ultimate responsibility for reporting disclosures lies with the individual authors, the
current protocols and policies regarding disclosure create an environment such that even
the most diligent and forthcoming of authors may become labeled as “misreporters.”

COI in Medical Education

Based on our investigation, it is apparent that nearly all (98%) of the medical
schools have some sort of policy requiring disclosure of industry ties to the institution
itself. Furthermore, 92% of these institutions are also accredited by the ACCME and are
therefore bound to their guidelines for CME activities. Conversely, a surprisingly small
percentages of schools have formal policies insisting that faculty divulge their industry
relationships to the students they teach or supervise in a laboratory setting (4% and 5%,
respectively). The finding that only a small minority of medical schools mandates
disclosure for student-directed activities may be indicative of the need for additional
strategies to maximize transparency and further limit the influence of industry on
academic pursuits. The concept of disclosure as a paradigm for managing possible COIs
has been widely utilized by medical journals and societies, and it may be a viable option
for medical schools as well. We expect the prevalence of these institution-driven
regulatory policies to increase substantially during the coming years.
Although the training programs for medicine and other professions are not
entirely analogous, law schools were selected as a benchmark for comparison. Among the
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institutions accredited by the ABA, only 18% had published disclosure policies and none
appeared to expect speakers to inform students of corporate support or other COIs in the
classroom or any other situation. Although the Association of American Law Schools
(AALS) has recognized the significance of disclosure-related issues, there are still no
formal guidelines that have been mandated for the institutions under its auspices [31].
This analysis also confirms that less than half (40%) of the medical schools had
definite policies limiting the acceptance of gifts from third parties. Only 22% of these
institutions prohibited faculty from receiving any items from commercial sources,
regardless of their monetary value. While 18% of medical schools allowed for the
provision of certain gifts that were of benefit to “academic pursuits” such as office
supplies, honoraria, and travel reimbursements, these policies were often vague and
subject to interpretation. Of note, 60% of medical schools had no such restrictions at all
at the time of this study. Nevertheless, this percentage is much lower relative to that
observed for law schools, of which merely 1% had implemented any type of strategy to
curb this practice.
We recognize that there are several limitations to this study. First, these findings
are derived from the guidelines posted on the official internet website of each school so
this review does not take into account internal documents that may exist regarding the
management of industry relationships; because of delays in updating these websites, it is
conceivable that these listings may not represent the most recent policies of these
institutions. It is possible that a survey of these schools may have circumvented this
problem but we elected not to send out questionnaires due to the potential for nonresponder bias and an inability to monitor whether the individuals who furnished the
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requested information were fully familiar with their institutions’ complex disclosure
protocols. As a result, we believe that the listings available on these schools’ websites are
a relatively accurate reflection of their official policies.
Given that virtually all medical schools have introduced some form of disclosure
policy, it is obvious that the issue of COIs and their deleterious effects on faculty as well
as the education of the next generation of practitioners has taken on greater importance.
The significantly lower number of institutions requiring the reporting of financial
relationships to students during educational activities and the variability in the degree to
which they restrict the acceptance of gifts from commercial entities indicates that
additional work needs to be done to develop more coherent guidelines to regulate these
types of interactions. Over the coming years, the landscape of COIs and disclosure
policies will continue to change significantly for both those in professional practice and
those in education in the hopes that we not only maintain transparency throughout the
entire process, but we also hold ourselves to the same standards we so often demand of
others.
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APPENDIX

NASS disclosure instructions“Financial relationships that have taken place within the last year are to be held to a
robust disclosure standard. NASS members participating in an activity should disclose all
financial relationships that have occurred within the last 12 months…”

CSRS disclosure instructions“All members shall disclose any personal or financial interest of conflicting fiduciary
obligation that may introduce or be perceived to introduce bias. Disclosure information
shall be updated annually.”

SRS disclosure instructions“It is the policy of Medical Education Resources (MER) and Scoliosis Research Society
to ensure balance, independence, objectivity, and scientific rigor in all its educational
activities. All faculty participating in our programs are expected to disclose any
relationships they may have with commercial companies whose products or services may
be mentioned so that participants may evaluate the objectivity of the presentations.”

